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Optimal Solutions to Infinite-Player Stochastic
Teams and Mean-Field Teams
Sina Sanjari, Serdar Yu¨ksel
Abstract—We study stochastic static teams with countably
infinite number of decision makers, with the goal of obtaining
(globally) optimal policies under a decentralized information
structure. We present sufficient conditions to connect the concepts
of team optimality and person by person optimality for static
teams with countably infinite number of decision makers. We
show that under uniform integrability and uniform convergence
conditions, an optimal policy for static teams with countably
infinite number of decision makers can be established as the
limit of sequences of optimal policies for static teams with
N decision makers as N → ∞. Under the presence of a
symmetry condition, we relax the conditions and this leads to
optimality results for a large class of mean-field optimal team
problems where the existing results have been limited to person-
by-person-optimality and not global optimality (under strict
decentralization). In particular, we establish the optimality of
symmetric (i.e., identical) policies for such problems. As a further
condition, this optimality result leads to an existence result for
mean-field teams. We consider a number of illustrative examples
where the theory is applied to setups with either infinitely many
decision makers or an infinite-horizon stochastic control problem
reduced to a static team.
Index Terms—Stochastic teams, average cost optimization,
decentralized control, mean-field theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A decentralized control system, or a team, consists of
a collection of decision makers/agents acting together to
optimize a common cost function, but not necessarily sharing
all the available information. Teams whose initial states, obser-
vations, cost function, or the evolution dynamics are random
or are disturbed by some external noise processes are called
stochastic teams. At each time stage, each agent only has
access to some parts of the global information. If each agent’s
information depends only on primitive random variables, the
team is static. If at least one agent’s information is affected
by an action of another agent, the team is said to be dynamic.
On teams with finitely many decision makers, Marschak
[36] studied optimal static teams and Radner [40] developed
foundational results on optimality, establishing connections
between person-by-person optimality, stationarity, and team-
optimality. Radner’s results were generalized in [30] by re-
laxing optimality conditions. A summary of these results is
that in the context of static team problems, convexity of the
cost function, subject to minor regularity conditions, may
suffice for the global optimality of person-by-person-optimal
solutions. In the particular case for LQG (Linear Quadratic
Gaussian) static teams, this result leads to the optimality of
linear policies [40], which also applies for dynamic LQG
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problems under specific information structures (to be discussed
further below) [23]. These results are applicable for static
teams with finite number of decision makers. In our paper,
the focus is on teams with infinitely many decision makers.
Connections with the literature on mean-field
games/teams. On the case with infinitely many decision
makers, a related set of results involves mean-field games:
mean-field games (see e.g., [25], [24], [34]) can be viewed as
limit models of symmetric non-zero-sum non-cooperative N -
player games with a mean-field interaction as N → ∞. The
uniqueness and non-uniqueness results have been established
for mean-field games in both the PDE and probabilistic setting
[34], [4], [11]. In [4], examples have been provided to show
the existence of multiple solutions to the mean-field games
when uniquness conditions in [34], [11] are violated. The
mean-field approach designs policies for both cases of games
with infinitely many players, as well as games with very
large number of players where the equilibruim policies for the
former are shown to be ǫ-equilibria for the latter [24], [42],
[12]. These results, while very useful for establishing equi-
libria or in the context of team problems, person-by-person-
optimal policies, does not guarantee the ǫ-global optimality
among all policies. That is, ǫ-person-by-person-optimality is
not sufficient for ǫ-global optimality; since in the limit one
typically only finds equilibrium policies without establishing
their uniqueness (which would imply global optimality for
team problems) [37], [44], [29]. Related to such problems,
in the economic theory literature, [44], [37], have consid-
ered Cournot-Nash equilibria. This Cournot-Nash equilibrium
concept corresponds to a mean-field equilibrium for a static
problem. However, such an equilibrium does not necessarily
imply global optimality in the context of team problems, as
discussed above.
Recently, mean-field team problems have also been stud-
ied: Social optima for mean-field LQG control problems
under both centralized and restricted decentralized information
structure have been considered in [26], [46]. In [2], a setup
is considered where decision makers share some information
on the mean-field in the system, and through showing that
the performance of a corresponding centralized system can be
realized under a restricted decentralized information structure,
global optimality is established. In our paper, we follow an
approach where optimality for every N is established and
also optimality holds as N → ∞ for the limit policy. The
papers [28], [27] have studied a continuous-time setup where
a major agent is present; by considering the social impact
for each individual player, they showed person by person
optimal policies asymptotically minimize the social cost [26].
By approximating the mean-field term, the authors bound
the induced approximation error of order O(N
−1
2 + ǫN )
where ǫN goes to zero as the number of players N → ∞
2[26]. In [9], mean-field team problems with mixed players
have been considered where minor agents act together to
minimize a common cost against a major player. Also, for
the LQ setup, under the assumption that DMs apply identical
policy in addition to some technical assumptions on the cost
function and transition probabilities of Markov chains, [1]
showed that the expected cost achieved by a sub-optimal
fully decentralized strategy is on ǫ(n) neighborhood of the
optimal cost achieved when mean-field (empirical distribution
of states) has been shared, where n is the number of players.
Such results on mean-field teams either show global optimality
through equivalence to the performance of a centralized setup
(considering specific sharing patterns on the mean-field model)
or typically only assume person-by-person-optimality. In our
paper, we will establish global optimality under a completely
decentralized information structure; however, certain technical
conditions will be imposed.
Connections with the literature on limits of finite player
games/teams. There exist contributions where games with
finitely many players are studied, their equilibrium solutions
are obtained and the limit is taken. Along this direction, the
connection between Nash equilibrium of symmetric N -player
games and an optimal solution of mean-field games has been
addressed in [5], [17], [18], [7], [3], [31]. The goal is to find
sufficient conditions such that the limit of the sequences of
Nash equilibrium for the N -player games identify as a solution
of the corresponding mean-field game as N → ∞. Conver-
gence of Nash equilibria of symmetric N -player games to
the corresponding mean-field games for stationary continuous-
time problems with ergodic costs has been investigated in [5],
[17]. Moreover, such a convergence of Nash equilibria for
symmetric N -player games to the corresponding mean-field
solution for a broad class of continuous time symmetric games
has been established in [18] under a uniform integrability and
exchangeability (symmetry) conditions (see [18, Theorem 5.1
and conditions (T) and (S)]) provided that the cost function and
dynamics admit the structural restrictions. In [31], assumptions
on equilibruim policies of the large population mean-field
symmetric stochastic differential games have been relaxed to
allow the convergence of asymmetric approximate Nash equi-
libria to a weak solution of the mean-field game [31, Theorem
2.6]. In a discrete-time setup, [7] considered convergence of
Nash equilibria for games with the mean-field interaction and
with ergodic costs for Markov processes. The convergence
result has been derived under an existence assumption on
the mean-field solution and an additional convexity condition
(see [7, Theorem 5.1 and condition (A7)]). In contrast, in the
context of stochastic teams with countably infinite number of
decision makers, the gap between person by person optimality
(Nash equilibrium in the game-theoretic context) and global
team optimality is significant since a perturbation of finitely
many policies fails to deviate the value of the expected cost,
thus person by person optimality is a weak condition for such
a setup, and hence the results presented in the aforementioned
papers may be inconclusive regarding global optimality of the
limit equilibrium. This observation motivates us to investigate
the connection between person by person optimality and global
team optimality in stochastic teams with countably infinite
decision makers. Compared with [5], [17], [18], [7], [3] where
only the convergence of a sequence of Nash equilibria for
symmetric games with the mean-field interaction has been
studied, we show that, under sufficient conditions, sequences
of optimal policies for teams with N number of decision
makers as N →∞ converge to a team optimal policy for the
static team with countably infinite number of decision makers.
Related to mean-field team problems, a limit theory for
mean-field type problems (also called Mckean-Vlasov stochas-
tic control problems) has been established in [32], [10]. In
[32], [10], the connection between solutions of N -player
differential control systems and solutions of Mckean-Vlasov
control problems has been investigated. It has been shown that
the sequence of empirical measures of pairs of states and ǫN -
centralized optimal controls (under the classical information
structure since all the information available are completely
shared between players) converges in distribution as N →∞
to limit points in the set of pairs of states and optimal
controls of the Mckean-Vlasov problem [32] (see Remark
3). In contrast, our focus is on the information structures of
decision makers. Here, under convexity of the cost function
and symmetry, we show the convergence of a sequence of
decentralized optimal policies of N -DM teams to an optimal
policy of mean-field teams as N →∞.
Connections with the literature on LQG games/teams.
There has been a number of studies focusing on the LQG
setup (in addition to [26], [46]). A close study is [35] where
LQG static teams with countably infinite number of decision
makers have been studied and sufficient conditions for global
optimality have been established. In our paper, we utilize some
of the results from [35], however compared with [35], we
propose sufficient conditions for team optimality on average
cost problems for a very general setup: except convexity, no
specific structure is presumed a priori on the cost function.
For our analysis, we do not restrict the setup to the LQG one,
where often direct methods can be applied building on [40],
[30], and operator theory involving matrix algebra; in addition,
we also study the mean-field setting. In fact, for a general
setup of static teams, we introduce sufficient conditions (see
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6) such that the optimal cost and
optimal policies of static teams with countably infinite number
of decision makers is obtained as a limit of the optimal
cost and optimal polices for static teams with N number of
decision makers as N → ∞. In [20], LQG team problems
with infinitely many decision makers have been considered
for a setup where the cost function is the expected inner-
product of an infinite dimensional vector (and to allow for
a Hilbert theoretic formulation, finiteness of the infinite sum
of the moments of individual random variables is imposed)
and linearity and uniqueness of optimal policies have been
established; the finiteness (of the infinite summation) restric-
tion rules out the setup in our paper. In [39], infinite horizon
decentralized stochastic control problems containing a remote
controller and a collection of local controllers dealing with
linear models have been addressed for a setup where the cost
is quadratic and the communication model satisfies a specified
sharing pattern of information between local controller and
remote controller. Under the assumed sharing pattern (common
information), the connections between the optimal solution
and the coupled algebraic Riccati equation for Markov jump
linear systems and its convergence to the coupled fixed point
equations have been utilized to show the optimality of the
solution [39].
As a further motivation for our study, we note that for
3dynamic team problems, Ho and Chu [23] have introduced
a technique such that dynamic partially nested LQG team
problems can be reduced to static team problems (we also note
that Witsenhausen [47] showed also that under an absolute
continuity condition, any sequential dynamic team can be
reduced to a static one). For infinite-horizon dynamic team
problems, this reduction leads to a static team with countably
many decision makers; thus leading to a different setup where
our results in this paper will be applicable. We will study a
particular example as a case study. In particular, the question
of whether partially nested dynamic LQG teams admit optimal
policies under an expected average cost criterion, in its most
general form, has not been conclusively addressed despite
the presence of results which impose linearity apriori for the
optimal policies under such information structures [41]. We
hope that our solution approach can be utilized in the future
to develop a complete theory for such problems.
Contributions.
(i) For a general setup of static teams, we show that (see
Theorem 6), under a uniform integrability condition (see
Remark 2), if sequences of team optimal policies of
decision makers i = 1, . . . , N of static teams with N
number of decision makers converge uniformly in i =
1, . . . , N (see (b) in Theorem 6), then the corresponding
limit policies are team optimal for the static team with
countably infinite number of decision makers, under the
expected average cost criteria.
(ii) We establish global optimality results for mean-field
teams under strict decentralization of the information
structure for both teams with large numbers of players
and infinitely many players. Toward this end, we in-
troduce a notion of symmetrically optimal teams (see
Definition 6) to obtain a global optimality result under
relaxed sufficient conditions (see Section IV). Under mild
conditions on action spaces and observations of decision
makers, through concentration of measures arguments,
we establish the convergence of optimal polices for
symmetric mean-field teams with N decision makers to
the corresponding optimal policy of mean-field teams (see
Section IV). In addition, we establish an existence result
for optimal policies on mean-field teams under relaxed
conditions on action spaces and the cost function (see
Theorem 12).
(iii) We apply our results to a number of illustrative examples:
We first consider LQG and LQ (non-Gaussian) average
cost problems with state coupling (see Section V-A and
Section V-B). We also consider LQG average cost prob-
lems with control coupling (see Section V-C). In addition,
we show that the team optimal policy of LQG teams
with classical information structure (see Section V-D)
is obtained using the technique proposed in this paper.
This is important since this result, while is well-known in
the stochastic control literature, has not been investigated
using static reduction proposed in [23] and hence this
approach can be viewed as a step to address optimal
solutions for infinite-horizon partially nested dynamic
LQG problems which can be reduced to a static team
with countably infinite number of decision makers.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Preliminaries and
the problem statement are presented in Section II. Section III
contains our main results including sufficient conditions for
team optimality and asymptotic optimality for a general setup
on static teams with countably infinite number of decision
makers. Section IV discusses symmetric and mean-field teams,
and applications are presented in Section V. Section VI
presents concluding remarks.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Preliminaries
Before presenting our main results, we introduce pre-
liminaries following the presentation in [52], in particular,
we introduce the characterizations laid out by Witsenhausen,
through his Intrinsic Model [48]; further characterizations
and classifications of information structures are introduced
comprehensively in [51]. Suppose there is a pre-defined order
in which the decision makers act. Such systems are called
sequential systems. The action and measurement spaces are
standard Borel spaces, that is, Borel subsets of complete,
separable and metric spaces. The Intrinsic Model for sequential
teams is defined as follows.
• There exists a collection of measurable spaces
{(Ω,F), (Ui,U i), (Vi,V i), i ∈ N}, specifying the
system’s distinguishable events, and control and
measurement spaces, where N denotes the set of natural
numbers. In this model (described in discrete time),
any action applied at any given time t ∈ N is regarded
as applied by a decision maker DMi for i ∈ N,
who acts only once. The pair (Ω,F) is a measurable
space (on which an underlying probability may be
defined). The pair (Ui,U i) denotes the measurable
space from which the action, ui, of decision maker i
is selected. The pair (Vi,V i) denotes the measurable
observation/measurement space.
• There is a measurement constraint to establish the con-
nection between the observation variables and the sys-
tem’s distinguishable events. The Vi-valued observation
variables are given by vi = hi(ω, u[1,i−1]), where
u[1,i−1] = {uk, k ≤ i − 1}, hi are given measurable
functions and uk denotes the action of DMk. Hence, vi
induces σ(vi) over Ω×
∏i−1
k=1 U
k.
• The set of admissible control laws γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . },
also called designs or policies, are measurable control
functions, so that ui = γi(vi). Let Γi denote the set of
all admissible policies for DMi and let Γ =
∏
i Γ
i.
• There is a probability measure P on (Ω,F) describing
the probability space on which the system is defined.
Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is
dynamic if the information available to at least one DM is
affected by the action of at least one other DM. A team
problem is static, if for every decision maker the information
available is only affected by exogenous disturbances; that is no
other decision maker can affect the information at any given
decision maker.
Information structures can also be categorized as classical,
quasi-classical or non-classical. An Information Structure (IS)
{vi, i ∈ N} is classical if vi contains all of the information
available to DMk for k < i. An IS is quasi-classical or
partially nested, if whenever uk, for some k < i, affects vi
through the measurement function hi, vi contains vk (that
is σ(vk) ⊂ σ(vi)). An IS which is not partially nested is
nonclassical.
4(P ′N ) Let N = |N | be the number of control actions taken,
and each of these actions is taken by a different decision
maker, whereN := {1, . . . , N}. Let γ
N
= {γ1, · · · , γN}
and let ΓN =
∏N
i Γ
i space of admissible policies for the
team with N DMs. Assume an expected cost function is
defined as
JN (γN ) = E
γ
N [c(ω0, uN )], (1)
for some Borel measurable cost function c : Ω0 ×∏N
k=1 U
k → R and where EγN [c(ω0, uN )] :=
E[c(ω0, γ
1(v1), · · · , γN(vN ))] and we define ω0 as the
cost function relevant exogenous variable and is contained
in ω, i.e., ω0 : (Ω0,F ,P) → (Ω0,Fω0) and Ω0 ⊂ Ω,
and Fω0 is σ-field generated by ω0. Here, we have the
notation uN := {u
i, i ∈ N}.
Definition 1. Team Optimal Solution for (P ′N ) [51].
For a given stochastic team problem with a given information
structure, a policy (strategy)N -tuple γ∗
N
:= (γ1
∗
, . . . , γN
∗
) ∈
ΓN is optimal (team-optimal solution) for (P ′N ) if
JN (γ
∗
N
) = inf
γ
N
∈ΓN
J(γ
N
) =: J∗N .
Definition 2. Person-by-person optimal solution [51].
For a given N -DM stochastic team with a fixed information
structure, an N -tuple of strategies γ∗
N
:= (γ1
∗
, . . . , γN
∗
)
constitutes a person-by-person optimal (pbp optimal) solution
for (P ′N ) if, for all β ∈ Γ
i and all i ∈ N , the following
inequalities hold:
J∗N := JN (γ
∗
N
) ≤ JN (γ
−i∗
N
, β),
where (γ−i∗
N
, β) := (γ1∗, . . . , γ(i−1)∗, β, γ(i+1)∗, . . . , γN∗).
To simplify notations, let for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N , γ−k
N
:=
{γi, i ∈ {1, · · · , N} \ {k}}.
Definition 3. Stationary solution [40].
A team decision rule γ
N
(.) is stationary if J(γ
N
) <∞, and
for all i = 1, ..., N , P-almost surely
∇uiE[c(ω0, (γ
−i
N
, ui))|vi]|ui=γi(vi)= 0,
where ∇ui denotes the gradient with respect to u
i.
In this subsection, without abuse of notations, we some-
times used γi as γi(vi). In the following, we present some
related existing results for static teams with N decision
makers. The following is known as Radner’s theorem [40].
Radner proposed the first result to connect the stationarity
concept and global team optimality.
Theorem 1. [40] If
(a) c(ω0, uN ) is convex and differentiable in uN for P-
almost all ω0 ∈ Ω0;
(b) inf
γ
N
∈ΓN
JN (γN ) > −∞;
(c) JN (.) is locally finite at γ
∗
N
[40];
(d) γ∗
N
is stationary;
then γ∗
N
is globally optimal for (P ′N ).
Radner’s theorem fails in some applications because of
the restrictive local finiteness assumption. Krainak et al [30]
relaxed assumptions and presented sufficient conditions for
team optimality on static teams.
Theorem 2. [30] Assume that, for every fixed ω0, c(ω0, uN ) is
convex differentiable in uN . Suppose (b) in Theorem 1 holds.
Let γ∗
N
∈ ΓN, and assume that E[c(ω0, γ∗N (vN ))] < ∞. If,
for all γ
N
∈ ΓN with E[c(ω0, γN (vN ))] <∞,
E[
N∑
i=1
cui(ω0, γ
∗
N
)(γi − γi∗)] ≥ 0, (2)
where cui(ω0, γ
∗
N
) is the partial derivative of c(ω0, uN ) with
respect to ui valued in uN = γ
∗
N
, then γ∗
N
is an optimal team
policy for (P ′N ). Moreover, if c(ω0, uN ) is strictly convex in
uN P-almost surely, then γ
∗
N
is P-a.s. unique.
Since the set of admissible policies is generally uncount-
able, checking (2) is difficult. Krainak et al [30] further
developed relaxed conditions under which stationarity of a
team decision rule implies its optimality.
Theorem 3. [30] Assume, for every fixed ω0 ∈ Ω0, that
c(ω0, uN ) is a convex differentiable function of uN and
suppose (b) in Theorem 1 holds. Assume that γ∗
N
∈ ΓN is
a stationary team decision rule. Let, for all γ
N
∈ ΓN with
E[c(ω0, γN (vN ))] <∞,
E[cui(ω0, γ
∗
N
)(γi − γi∗)] <∞ for i = 1, ..., N. (3)
Then γ∗
N
is a team optimal policy for (P ′N ). If c(ω0, uN ) is
strictly convex in uN , P-a.s., then γ
∗
N
is unique.
Furthermore, (3) can be replaced by the following more
checkable conditions [51]: Let Γi be Hilbert space for each
i = 1, ..., N and E[c(ω0, γN (vN))] < ∞ for all γN ∈ ΓN.
Moreover, let
E[cui(ω0, γ
∗
N
)|vi] ∈ Γi, i = 1, ..., N. (4)
The above conditions follows directly from (3) when Γi is a
Hilbert space for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . This condition can be
checked for some applications; for example, LQ teams [51].
B. Problem statement
(P∞) Consider a team with countably infinitely many decision
makers. Let Γ =
∏
i∈N Γ
i be a countable but an infinite
product policy space. We assume Ui = Rn, and Vi = Rm
for all i ∈ N, where n and m are positive integers. Let
c : Ω0 × Rn × Rn → R+, and the expected cost be
J(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
γ [
N∑
i=1
c(ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up)], (5)
where Eγ [
∑N
i=1 c(ω0, u
i, 1
N
∑N
p=1 u
p)] :=
E
[∑N
i=1 c(ω0, γ
i(vi), 1
N
∑N
p=1 γ
p(vp))
]
.
Definition 4. Team Optimal Solution for (P∞).
For a given stochastic team problem with a given information
structure, a policy γ∗ := (γ1∗, γ2∗, . . .) ∈ Γ is optimal for
(P∞) if
J(γ∗) = inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ) =: J∗.
Our goal in this paper is to establish conditions for a team
policy to be optimal, and also connect the optimal cost and
policies for (P∞) and (PN ). To this end, we re-define (PN )
for our problem statement as follows:
5(PN ) Let N = |N | be the number of control actions taken
and γ
N
= {γ1, · · · , γN} and let ΓN =
∏N
i Γ
i space of
admissible policies for the team with N DMs. Assume
an expected cost function is defined as
JN (γN ) =
1
N
E
γ
N [
N∑
i=1
c(ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up)]. (6)
We will investigate the relations between the sequence of
solutions to (6) and the solution to (5). We note that our main
result is on the connection between (P∞) and (PN ).
III. OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR TEAMS WITH INFINITELY
MANY DECISION MAKERS
A. Sufficient conditions of optimality
In the following, we propose sufficient conditions of team
optimality for (P∞). We often follow [30], and the result is
an extension of [30] to a general setup of static teams with
countably infinite number of decision makers. We also note
a related analysis in [35]. We will use the following theorem
for LQ static teams with countably infinite number of decision
makers (see Section V-B).
Assumption 1. Let
(A1) c(ω0, u
i, 1
N
∑N
p=1 u
p) be a R+-valued jointly convex
function of second and third arguments and differen-
tiable in ui with continuous partial derivatives, for every
ω0 ∈ Ω0.
(A2) for some γ∗ ∈ Γ,
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
γ∗
(
c(ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up)
)
<∞. (7)
We note that the cost function is differentiable in
ui which means that the cost is totally differentiable in
ui, i.e., d
dui
c(ω0, u
i, 1
N
∑N
p=1 u
p) = ∂
∂ui
c(ω0, u
i, µN ) +
1
N
∂
∂µN
c(ω0, u
i, µN ).
Theorem 4. Assume (A1) holds and (A2) holds for γ∗ ∈ Γ.
If for all γ ∈ Γ with J(γ) <∞,
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
cuk(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗)(γk − γk∗)
)
≥ 0,
(8)
where µ∗N =
1
N
∑N
p=1 γ
p∗(vp), then γ∗ is a globally optimal
team policy for (P∞).
Proof. Under (A1), the required derivatives in (8) in the
direction of ui exist and the chain rule of derivatives can
be applied since this implies that the cost function is Fre´chet
differentiable in ui [19]. Now, we use the convexity property to
justify interchanging the expectation and the derivation similar
to [30, Theorem 2], then we use (7) and (8) to establish the
global optimality of γ∗ for (P∞). Under (A1), we have for
every α ∈ (0, 1],
N∑
i=1
c(ω0,γ
i∗ + αδi, µ∗N +
α
N
N∑
p=1
δp)− c(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗N )
≤ α
N∑
i=1
(
c(ω0, γ
i, µN )− c(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗N )
)
,
where µN =
1
N
∑N
p=1 γ
p(vp) and δi = γi − γi∗. Let
hωN (α) :=
1
α
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
c(ω0, γ
i∗ + αδi, µ∗N +
α
N
N∑
p=1
δp)
− c(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗N)].
Hence, [14, Proposition 6.3.2] implies that hωN(α) is a mono-
tone non-increasing function as α → 0 in α ∈ [0, 1] and
bounded from above by hωN (1). Thus, by [14, Corollary
6.3.3], h′+,N(ω, 0) := limα→0 h
ω
N (α) exists. Since h
ω
N (α) is a
monotonic non-increasing function as α→ 0 in α ∈ [0, 1] and
bounded above by hωN (1), and since J(γ
∗) and J(γ) are finite,
we can choose N large enough such that E(hωN (1)) < ∞.
Now, we can use the monotone convergence theorem (see [22,
page. 170]) to interchange the limit and the expectation
lim
α→0
E(hωN (α)) = E( lim
α→0
hωN (α)) = E(h
′
+,N (ω, 0)). (9)
From [30, Lemma 1], we have E(h′+,N (ω, 0)) =
1
N
E(
∑N
i=1
∑N
k=1 cuk(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗N )δ
k). Define
FNγ
N
(α) :=
1
N
E
(
N∑
i=1
c(ω0, γ
i∗ + αδi, µ∗N +
α
N
N∑
p=1
δp)
)
.
Note that FNγ
N
(α) exists for α ∈ [0, 1] since E(hωN (α)) ≤
E(hωN (1)) <∞, and E(
1
N
∑N
i=1 c(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗N )) <∞. There-
fore, one can write F ′N
γ
+
N
(0) = lim
α→0
E(hω(α)), and
F ′N
γ
+
N
(0) =
1
N
E
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
cuk(ω0, γ
i∗, µ∗N )(γ
k − γk∗)
)
Thus, we can write
J(γ)− J(γ∗) = lim sup
N→∞
FNγ
N
(1)− lim sup
N→∞
FNγ
N
(0) (10)
= lim sup
N→∞
FNγ
N
(1)− lim inf
N→∞
FNγ
N
(0) (11)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
FNγ
N
(1)− FNγ
N
(0)
1
(12)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
F ′N
γ
+
N
(0) ≥ 0, (13)
where (11) follows from (A2) and (7), and − lim inf
N→∞
aN =
lim sup
N→∞
−aN , lim sup
N→∞
aN + lim sup
N→∞
bN ≥ lim sup
N→∞
(aN + bN )
imply (12), and (13) holds since FNγ
N
(.) is a convex function
and using [14, Corollary 6.3.3], and since aN ≥ bN then
lim sup
N→∞
aN ≥ lim sup
N→∞
bN . Finally, the last inequality follows
from (8); hence, J(γ)−J(γ∗) ≥ 0, and the proof is completed.
In some applications, (8) can be difficult to check since it
must be satisfied for all γ ∈ Γ with J(γ) < ∞. In the next
section, we address this issue by introducing a constructive
approach for static teams with countably infinite number of
decision makers as a limit of a sequence of team optimal
policies of the corresponding static teams with finite number
of decision makers. In the following, we propose sufficient
conditions to approximate the optimal cost and a team optimal
policy for static teams with countably infinite number of
decision makers using the optimal cost and an optimal policy
6for static teams with N decision makers. We note that our first
result here is based on [35, Theorem 1], which considered an
equality. We denote γ|N∈ ΓN as a restriction of γ ∈ Γ to the
first N components.
Theorem 5. Let γ∗
N
∈ ΓN be an optimal policy for (PN )
as (6) (see [30], [21], [52] for sufficient conditions). If there
exists γ∗ ∈ Γ, with J(γ∗) <∞, satisfying
lim sup
N→∞
JN (γ
∗
N
) ≥ J(γ∗), (14)
then γ∗ is a globally team optimal policy for (P∞).
Proof. We have
J(γ∗) ≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
γ∗
N
(
c(ω0, u
i, µN)
)
(15)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
γ
N
∈ΓN
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
γ
N
(
c(ω0, u
i, µN )
)
(16)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
γ∈Γ
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
γ
(
c(ω0, u
i, µN )
)
(17)
≤ inf
γ∈Γ
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
γ
(
c(ω0, u
i, µN )
)
(18)
= inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ),
where µN :=
1
N
∑N
p=1 u
p and (15) follows from (14), and (16)
is true since γ∗N is a team optimal policy for (PN ) (see (6)).
Furthermore, (17) follows from the fact that [γ|N : γ ∈ Γ] =
ΓN, where γ|N is γ restricted to the first N components.
Remark 1. Under (A2), one can replace (14) with
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
γ∗
N
(
c(ω0, u
i, µN )
)
− Eγ
∗ (
c(ω0, u
i, µN )
))
≥ 0.
(19)
The above theorem and remark will be useful for some
applications (see for example Section V-D).
B. Asymptotically optimal policies as a limit of finite team
optimal policies
In the following, we present a sufficient condition for (14).
The following result also presents a constructive method to
obtain optimal policies using asymptotic analysis.
Theorem 6. Assume
(a) for every N, there exist γ∗
N
∈ ΓN for (PN ) (see (6)),
(b) let ω ∈ B for some B ∈ F event of P measure one, for
every fixed vi(ω), γi∗N (v
i) converges to γi∗∞(v
i) uniformly
in i = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e.,
lim
N→∞
sup
1≤i≤N
||γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)||= 0 P− a.s.,
where ||·|| is the sup norm,
(c) there exists a P-integrable function g(ω0, v) such that, for
every N ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i),
1
N
N∑
p=1
γp∗∞ (v
p)
)
≤ g(ω0, v),
where v = (v1, v2, . . . ), then γ∗, a team optimal policy for
(P∞), is a pointwise limit of γ∗N , an optimal policy for (PN ),
i.e., γi∗(vi) = lim
N→∞
γi∗N (v
i) = γi∗∞(v
i) P-almost surely.
Proof. According to Theorem 5, we only need to show that
lim sup
N→∞
JN (γ
∗
N
) ≥ lim inf
N→∞
JN (γ
∗
N
)
≥ E
(
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
c(ω0, γ
i∗
N (v
i), µ∗N )
)
= lim
N→∞
JN (γ
∗
∞
),
where µ∗N =
1
N
∑N
p=1 γ
p∗
N (v
p) and the second inequality
follows from Fatou’s lemma (since the cost function is non-
negative). In the following, we justify the equality above. On
a set of P measure one, ω ∈ B where B ∈ F , for every
fixed vi(ω) in this set, define v(ω) = (v1(ω), v2(ω), ...) and
vN (ω) = (v
1(ω), . . . , vN (ω)). We follow three steps to prove
the theorem.
(Step 1): We show that on a set of P measure one, ω ∈
B where B ∈ F , for every fixed vi(ω) in this set
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1
(
γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)
)
= 0. For a fixed v, fol-
lowing from (b) for a given δω,v
N
:= sup1≤i≤N ||γ
i∗
N (v
i) −
γi∗∞(v
i)||> 0 there exists Nˆ(δω,v
N
) ∈ N such that for
N > Nˆ(δω,v
N
), ||γi∗N (v
i) − γi∗∞(v
i)||≤ δω,v
N
for every
i = 1, . . . , N , where lim
N→∞
δω,v
N
= 0 P-almost surely. We
have P-almost surely,
||
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)
)
||<
1
N
N∑
i=1
δω,v
N
= δω,v
N
,
and since lim
N→∞
sup1≤i≤N ||γ
i∗
N (v
i) − γi∗∞(v
i)||= 0, one
can see lim
N→∞
δω,v
N
= 0. Hence, we can show
that lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 γ
i∗
N (v
i) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 γ
i∗
∞(v
i). Fol-
lowing from continuity, c(ω0, γ
i∗
N (v
i), µ∗N ) converges to
c(ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), lim
N→∞
µ∗∞) P-a.s. for every i = 1. . . . , N .
(Step 2): We show that c(ω0, γ
i∗
N (v
i), µ∗N ) converges to
c(ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), lim
N→∞
µ∗∞) uniformly in i = 1, . . . , N P-
almost surely, where µ∗∞ =
1
N
∑N
p=1 γ
p∗
∞ (v
p). By continuity
of the cost function, we have for a given ǫω,v
N
> 0,
there exists δω,v
N
> 0 such that ||γi∗N (v
i) − γi∗∞(v
i)||<
δω,v
N
, and || 1
N
∑N
i=1
(
γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)
)
||< δω,v
N
implies
|c(ω0, γi∗N (v
i), µ∗N ) − c(ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), µ∗∞)|< ǫω,vN P-almost
surely for every i = 1, . . . , N . Following from Step 1, we
have for N > Nˆ(δω,v
N
(ǫω,v
N
)), ||γi∗N (v
i)−γi∗∞(v
i)||< δω,v
N
,
and || 1
N
∑N
i=1
(
γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)
)
||< δω,v
N
, hence P-a.s.
|c(ω0, γ
i∗
N (v
i), µ∗N )− c(ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), µ∗∞)|< ǫω,vN ,
where lim
N→∞
ǫω,v
N
= 0.
(Step 3): In this step, we show that P-a.s.,
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
c(ω0, γ
i∗
N (v
i), µ∗N )− c(ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), µ∗∞)
)
= 0.
7According to Step 2, for N > Nˆ(δω,v
N
(
ǫω,v
N
)
)
, we have
P-a.s.
|
1
N
N∑
i=1
c(ω, γi∗N (v
i), µ∗N )− c(ω, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), µ∗∞)|< ǫω,vN .
Following from (c), we can interchange the limit and the
integral using the dominated convergence theorem, and the
proof is completed.
Remark 2. One can relax conditions in Theorem 6 as follows:
(i) relax (a) by considering a sequence of ǫN -optimal policy,
where ǫN are non-negative and converges to zero asN →
∞,
(ii) relax (c) with a uniform integrability condition which
is satisfied if the following expression is finite (see [6,
Theorem 3.5]),
sup
N≥1
E


∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i),
1
N
N∑
i=1
γi∗∞(v
i)
)∣∣∣∣∣
1+ǫ

 ,
for some ǫ > 0. This new condition can be checked in
some applications (see Section V). The result follows from
[6, Theorem 3.5],
(iii) relax the P-almost sure convergence in (b) by considering
convergence in probability, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
P( sup
1≤i≤N
||γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)||≥ ǫ) = 0,
hence similar to the proof of Theorem 6, Step 1, us-
ing continuous mapping theorem (see for example, [6,
page 20]), we can show that c(ω0, γ
i∗
N (v
i), µ∗N ) con-
verges to c(ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), lim
N→∞
µ∗∞) in probability. Sim-
ilarly, the result of Step 2 holds in probability. Us-
ing [6, Theorem 3.5], under the uniform integrablity
of XN :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 c
(
ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), 1
N
∑N
i=1 γ
i∗
∞(v
i)
)
and under convergence in probability XN to X :=
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1 c
(
ω0, γ
i∗
∞(v
i), 1
N
∑N
i=1 γ
i∗
∞(v
i)
)
, we can
conclude E(XN )→ E(X). This relaxation can be useful
when the weak law of large numbers can be invoked to
check (c), but the strong law of large numbers fails to
apply.
We apply the results of this section to two examples in
Sections V-A and V-B.
In the following section, we show that under symmetry
of optimal policies, sufficient conditions of optimality can be
satisfied quite effortlessly.
IV. GLOBALLY OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR MEAN-FIELD
TEAMS
A. Symmetric teams
In the following, we present sufficient conditions for team
optimality in symmetric and mean-field teams. The concept of
symmetry has been studied in a variety of contexts; see e.g.,
[38], [13] and many others.
Definition 5. (Exchangeable teams)
A N -DM team is exchangeable if the value of the expected
cost function (see (1)) is invariant under every permutation of
policies.
We note that it is also called totally symmetric in a game
theoretic context (see for example [13]).
Definition 6. (Symmetrically optimal teams)
A team is symmetrically optimal, if for every given policy, there
exists an identically symmetric policy (i.e., each DM has the
same policy) which performs at least as good as the given
policy.
In the following, we characterize the symmetry of the
general setup for (P ′N ) (see (1)) defined in Section II-A.
Clearly, the result will also hold for the (PN ) (see (6))
defined in Section II-B. First, we recall the definition of an
exchangeable finite set of random variables.
Definition 7. Random variables x1, x2, . . . , xN are ex-
changeable if any permutation, σ, of the set of indexes
{1, . . . , N} fails to change the joint probability measures
of random variables, i.e., P(dxσ(1), dxσ(2), . . . , dxσ(N)) =
P(dx1, dx2, . . . , dxN ).
Lemma 1. For a fixed N , consider a N -DM team defined
as (P ′N ) (see (1)) and let the cost function be a convex
function of uN P-almost surely. Assume the cost function
is exchangeable P-almost surely with respect to the actions,
i.e., for any permutation of indexes, σ, P-almost surely
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN ) = c(ω0, u
σ(1), . . . , uσ(N)). If U is convex,
and observations of DMs are exchangeable conditioned on ω0,
then the team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. Any permutation of policies does not deviate the value
of JN (γN ) since
JN (γ
σ
N
)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN )PN (dv
1, . . . , dvN |ω0)
× 1{(γσ(1)(v1),...,γσ(N)(vN ))}(du
1, . . . , duN )P(dω0)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
σ(1), . . . , uσ(N))
× 1{(γσ(1)(vσ(1)),...,γσ(N)(vσ(N)))}(du
σ(1), . . . , duσ(N))
× PN (dv
σ(1), . . . , dvσ(N)|ω0)P(dω0) (20)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN )1{(γ1(v1),...,γN(vN ))}(du
1, . . . , duN)
× PN (dv
1, . . . , dvN |ω0)P(dω0)
= JN (γN ),
where (20) follows from the assumption that the cost function
is exchangeable with respect to the actions, and the hypothesis
that observations of DMs are P-almost surely exchangeable
conditioned on ω0. Let γ
∗
N
= (γ1∗, γ2∗, . . . , γN∗) be a
team optimal policy for (P ′N ) (see (1)). Consider γ˜N as a
convex combination of all possible permutations of policies
by averaging them, σ ∈ Σ, where Σ is the set of all possible
permutation. Since U is convex, γ˜
N
is a control policy.
Following from P-almost sure convexity of the cost function,
we have for
∑
σ∈Σ ασ = 1,
JN (γ˜N) := JN (
∑
σ∈Σ
ασγ
∗,σ
N
) ≤
∑
σ∈Σ
ασJN (γ
∗,σ
N
)
8=
∑
σ∈Σ
ασJN (γ
∗
N
) = JN (γ
∗
N
),
where the inequality follows from P-almost sure convexity of
the cost function for every fixed realization of observations
since we have
E(c(ω0,
∑
σ∈Σ
ασ(γ
∗,σ
N
)1(v1), . . . ,
∑
σ∈Σ
ασ(γ
∗,σ
N
)N (vN )))
≤ E(
∑
σ∈Σ
ασc(ω0, (γ
∗,σ
N
)1(v1), . . . , (γ∗,σ
N
)N (vN )))
=
∑
σ∈Σ
ασE(c(ω0, (γ
∗,σ
N
)1(v1), . . . , (γ∗,σ
N
)N (vN ))),
where (γ∗,σ
N
)j denotes the j-the component of γ∗,σ
N
, and the
inequality above follows from Jensen’s inequality since the
cost function is convex P-almost surely. Hence, γ˜
N
is team
optimal and the team is symmetrically optimal.
In the following, we present another characterization of
symmetrically optimal teams; this looks to be a standard result;
however, a proof is included for completeness since we could
not find an explicit reference.
Lemma 2. For a fixed N , consider an N -DM team defined as
(P ′N ) (see (1)) and let the cost function be a convex function
of uN P-almost surely. Assume the set of action space for
each DM is convex. If the expected cost function (see (1)) is
exchangeable with respect to the policies, then the team is
symmetrically optimal.
Proof. Let γ∗
N
= (γ1∗, γ2∗, . . . , γN∗) be a team optimal
policy for (P ′N ) (see (1)). According to the definition of
exchangeable teams, any permutation of policies, say γˆ∗
N
=
(γi1∗, γi2∗, . . . , γiN∗), fails to change the value of the expected
cost function, and hence γˆ∗
N
is team optimal for (P ′N ) (see
(1)). Consider γ˜
N
as a uniform randomization among all
possible permutations of optimal policies, since U is convex
then γ˜
N
is a control policy. By convexity of the cost function,
through Jensen’s inequality, and the fact that any permutation
of optimal policies preserves the value of the cost function, we
have JN (γ˜N ) ≤ JN (γ
∗
N
). Since γ∗
N
is team optimal for (P ′N )
(see (1)), γ˜
N
is also team optimal for (P ′N ) (see (1)) which is
also identically symmetric, and this completes the proof.
Now, we characterize symmetrically optimal teams for
(PN ) (see (6)).
Theorem 7. Consider a N -DM team defined as (PN ) (see
(6)) in Section II-B. Let action spaces be convex and the cost
function be convex in the second and third arguments P-almost
surely. If observations are exchangeable conditioned on ω0,
then the team is symmetrically optimal.
Proof. The cost function defined in (PN ) (see (6)) is ex-
changeable in actions, hence under convexity of the action
spaces and the cost function and following from the hypothesis
that observations are exchangeable condition on ω0, the proof
is completed using Lemma 1.
Theorem 7 will be utilized in our analysis to follow.
B. Optimal solutions for mean-field teams as limits of optimal
policies for finite symmetric teams
In the following, we present results for symmetrically
optimal static teams. First, we focus on the case that the
observations of decision makers are identical and independent,
then we deal with non-identical and dependent observations
under additional assumptions. As we noted earlier, mean-field
games studied in [18] belong to this class in a game theoretic
context; in [18] concentration of measures arguments and
independence of measurements have been utilized to justify the
convergence of equilibria (person-by-person-optimality in the
team setup). We also note that [29] and [37] have considered
symmetry conditions for mean-field games. In the context
of LQ mean-field teams, [2] has considered a setup where
DMs share the mean-field in the system either completely or
partially (through showing that a centralized performance can
be attained under the restricted information structure). Also,
for the LQ setup under the assumption that DMs apply an
identical policy in addition to some technical assumptions, [1]
showed that the expected cost achieved by a sub-optimal fully
decentralized strategy is on ǫ(n) neighborhood of the optimal
expected cost achieved when mean-field (empirical distribution
of states) has been shared, where n is the number of players.
In [28], a continuous-time setup with a major agent has been
studied.
Remark 3. We note that, in [32, Section 2.4], [10, Chapter
6 Volume I], the connection between solutions of N -player
differential control systems and solutions of Mckean-Vlasov
control problems has been investigated under either the as-
sumption that the information structure is classical (i.e., the
problem is centralized) since the controls, uit, for each player
are assumed to be progressively measurable with respect to the
filtration generated by all initial states, (X10 , . . . , X
N
0 ) and
Wiener processes of all DMs ({(W 1s , . . . ,W
N
s ), s ≤ t}), or
by imposing structural assumptions on the controllers where
controllers assumed to belong to the open-loop class (with
their definition being, somewhat non-standard, that uit are pro-
gressively measurable with respect to the filtration generated
by initial states and Wiener processes instead of the path of
states X is for s ≤ t) or to belong to Markovian controllers
(i.e., uit = φ
i(t,X it) where φ
i are measurable functions)
[32],[10, pages 72-76]. Also, in [32, Theorem 2.11], it has
been shown that a sequence of relaxed (measure-valued) open-
loop ǫN -optimal policies for N -player differential control
systems (with only coupling on states) converges to a relaxed
open-loop Mckean-Vlasov control optimal solution. Under
additional assumptions, the existence of a strong solution and
a Markovian optimal solution of McKean-Vlasov solution has
been established [32, Theorem 2.12 and Corollary 2.13]. In
the mean-field team setup, under the decentralized information
structure, it is not clear apriori whether the limsup of the
expected cost function and states of dynamics forN -DM teams
converge to the limit. In fact, the information structure of the
team problem can break the symmetry and also can prevent
establishing a limit theory (for example, by considering a
partial sharing of observations between DMs). Here, by fo-
cusing on the decentralized setup and by considering mean-
field coupling of controls, using a convexity argument and
symmetry, we show that a sequence of optimal policies for
(PN ) converges pointwise to an optimal policy for (P∞).
9Our next theorem, under the assumption that observations
are independent and identically distributed, utilizes a measure
concentration argument to establish a convergence result.
Theorem 8. Consider a team defined as (P∞) (see (5)) with
the convex cost function in the second and third arguments
P-almost surely. Let the action space be compact and convex
for each decision maker, and vis be i.i.d. random variables. If
there exists a sequence of optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6)),
{γ∗N}N , which converges (for every decision maker due to the
symmetry) pointwise to γ∗∞ as N → ∞, then γ
∗
∞ (which is
identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P∞).
Proof. Action spaces and the cost function are convex and
following from the hypothesis that vis are i.i.d. random
variables (hence they are exchangeable conditioned on ω0)
and the result of Theorem 7, one can consider a sequence
of N -DM teams which are symmetrically optimal that defines
(PN ) (see (6)) and whose limit is identified with (P∞). Define
QωN (B) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 1ζiN∈B, and Q˜
ω
N(B) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 1ζi∞∈B,
where B ∈ Z := U × V, U =
∏
iU
i, Y =
∏
i Y
i, and
ζiN := (γ
∗
N (v
i), vi), ζi∞ := (γ
∗
∞(v
i), vi). In the following,
we first show that Q˜ωN converges P-almost sure weakly to
Qω = δE(ζi
∞
) in the space of probability measures in Z , P(Z),
then we show (14) holds, and we invoke Theorem 5.
(Step 1): For every g ∈ Cb(Z), where we denote Cb(X) as
the space of continuous and bounded functions in X , we have
lim
N→∞
P
(∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωN −
∫
gdQ˜ωN
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
)
≤ ǫ−1 lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
(∣∣g(γ∗N (vi), vi)− g(γ∗∞(vi), vi)∣∣)
(21)
= ǫ−1 lim
N→∞
E
(∣∣g(γ∗N (vi), vi)− g(γ∗∞(vi), vi)∣∣) (22)
= ǫ−1E
(
lim
N→∞
∣∣g(γ∗N (vi), vi)− g(γ∗∞(vi), vi)∣∣) = 0,
(23)
where (21) follows from Markov inequality, the triangle in-
equality and the definition of the empirical measure, and (22)
follows from the hypothesis that vis are identical random
variables. Since g is bounded and continuous, the dominated
convergence theorem implies (23). Following from (23), for
every subsequence there exists a subsubsequence such that
|
∫
gdQωNk
l
−
∫
gdQ˜ωNk
l
| converges to zero P-almost surely
as l → ∞. On the other hand, since vis are i.i.d. random
variables, the law of large numbers implies Q˜ωN converges P-
almost sure weakly to Qω = δE(ζi
∞
) in the space of probability
measures in Z , P(Z), that is |
∫
gdQ˜ωN −
∫
gdQω| converges
to zero P-almost surely for every g ∈ Cb(Z). Hence, through
choosing a suitable subsequence, QωNk converges P-almost
sure weakly to Qω since for every continuous and bounded
function g, we have P-a.s.,
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωN −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
N→∞
(
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωN −
∫
gdQ˜ωN
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQ˜ωN −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣)
= 0. (24)
(Step 2): Following from [45, Theorem 3.5] and [16, Lemma
1.5], or [33, Theorem 3.1] using the fact that the cost function
is non-negative and continuous, we have
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
c
(
ω0, γ
∗
N (v
i),
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ∗N (v
i)
)]
≥ lim inf
N→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
×QωN(du, dv)P(dω)
≥
∫
Ω
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
×QωN(du, dv)P(dω)
≥
∫
Ω
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du × V)
)
Qω(du, dv)P(dω),
(25)
where the first inequality follows from the definition of QωN
and replacing limsup by liminf. The second inequality follows
from Fatou’s lemma. In the following, we justify (25). Since
QωN converges P-almost sure weakly to Q
ω, using continuous
mapping theorem [6, page 20], we haveQωN (du×V) converges
P-almost sure weakly to Qω(du×V), hence the compactness
of U implies
∫
U
uQωN(du × V) →
∫
U
uQω(du × V)
for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, and P-almost sure continuity
of the cost function implies c(ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V))
converges to c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du × V)
)
P-almost
surely. Define a non-negative bounded sequence
GMN := min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
}, where
GNM ↑ G
N := c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du× V)
)
as M → ∞, then
we have P-almost surely
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN (du× V)
)
QωN (du, dv)
= lim
M→∞
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
QωN (du, dv)
≥ lim
M→∞
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
GMN Q
ω
N (du, dv)
= lim
M→∞
∫
Z
GMQω(du, dv)
=
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du× V)
)
Qω(du, dv),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of GMN
and the second equality is true using [45, Theorem 3.5]
since GMN is bounded (hence is uniformly Q
ω
N -integrable) and
continuously converges to GM , and the monotone convergence
theorem implies the last equality. Hence, (25) holds which
implies (14), and the proof is completed using Theorem 5.
Remark 4. The proof above reveals that if P-almost surely
the sequence {QωN}N converges weakly to Q
ω, then Theorem
8 can be generalized to a class of team problems defined as
(P∞) (see (5)) which may include ones with a non-convex cost
function and/or the ones with conditionally non-exchangeable
observations: This relaxation contains a class of problems (see
e.g. Example 4 in Section V-C1) where one can consider a
sequence of N -DM teams which admits asymmetric optimal
policies that define (PN ) (see (6)), but whose limit is identified
with (P∞) under an optimal sequence of policies.
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In the following, we relax the hypothesis that observations
of decision makers are independent.
Proposition 1. Consider a team defined as (P∞) (see (5)) with
the convex cost function in the second and third arguments P-
almost surely. Let the action space be compact and convex for
each decision maker, and vi = h(x, zi), where zis are i.i.d.
random variables. If there exists a sequence of optimal policies
for (PN ) (see (6)), {γ
∗
N}N , which converges pointwise to γ
∗
∞
as N → ∞, then γ∗∞ (which is identically symmetric) is an
optimal policy for (P∞).
Proof. Since zis are i.i.d. random variables, observations, vi =
h(x, zi), have identical distributions (but are not independent),
and similar to the proof of Theorem 8, using symmetry, one
can show (23) holds. In the following, we show (24) and (25)
hold.
lim
N→∞
P
(∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQ˜ωN −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
)
≤
1
ǫ2
lim
N→∞
E


∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
g(γ∗∞(v
i), vi)− E(g(γ∗∞(v
1), v1))
∣∣∣∣∣
2


(26)
= lim
N→∞
(ǫ)−2E

E


∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
L(γ∗∞(v
i), vi)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| x



 (27)
= 0 (28)
where L(γ∗∞(v
i), vi) := g(γ∗∞(v
i), vi) − E(g(γ∗∞(v
1), v1)),
and (26) follows from Chebyshev’s inequality, and (27) fol-
lows from the law of iterated expectations. The structure
vi = h(x, zi) implies conditional independence of vis given x,
hence, using the law of large numbers and since g ∈ Cb(Z),
we have (28), and this implies Q˜ωNk converges P-almost sure
weakly to Qω as k → ∞, hence through choosing a suitable
subsequence, QωNkl converges P-almost sure weakly to Q
ω as
l→∞ and the rest of the proof to justify (25) is the same as
that of Theorem 8.
Remark 5. Existence of optimal policies for (PN ) and dy-
namic teams satisfying static reduction have been studied in
[50] and [21]. In [50, Theorem 4.8], the existence of opti-
mal policies achieved under σ-compactness of each decision
maker’s action space and under mild conditions on the control
law and the cost function. Hence the existence of identically
symmetric optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6)) follows from
symmetry and [50, Theorem 4.8]; thus, the existence result
for (P∞) is obtained under assumptions of Theorem 8.
In the following, action spaces need not be compact; this
is particularly important for LQG models as we will see in
the next section.
Theorem 9. Consider a team defined as (P∞) (see (5)) with
the convex cost function in the second and third arguments
P-almost surely. Let the action spaces be convex for each
decision maker. Let vis be i.i.d. random variables. If there
exists a sequence of optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6)),
{γ∗N}N , which converges pointwise to γ
∗
∞ as N →∞, and
(A3) for some δ > 0, sup
N≥1
E(|γ∗N (v
1)− γ∗∞(v
1)|1+δ) <∞,
then γ∗∞ (which is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy
for (P∞).
Proof. In the following, we just show
∫
U
uQωN(du × V) →∫
U
uQω(du × V) for P almost all ω ∈ Ω, and the rest of the
proof follows from that of Theorem 8. We have
lim
N→∞
P
(∣∣∣∣
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)−
∫
U
udQ˜ωN(du × V)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
)
≤ ǫ−1 lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
(∣∣γ∗N (vi)− γ∗∞(vi)∣∣) (29)
= ǫ−1 lim
N→∞
E
(∣∣γ∗N (v1)− γ∗∞(v1)∣∣) (30)
= ǫ−1E
(
lim
N→∞
∣∣γ∗N (v1)− γ∗∞(v1)∣∣) = 0, (31)
where (29) follows from Markov’s inequality and the triangle
inequality, and (30) is true since observations have identical
distributions, and (31) follows from the uniform integrability
assumption (A3) and using [6, Theorem 3.5]. On the other
hand, SLLN implies P-almost surely that
∫
U
uQ˜ωN(du×V) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 γ
∗
∞(v
i) →
∫
U
uQω(du × V), and this completes the
proof.
In the following, we present a result for monotone mean-
field coupled teams.
Theorem 10. Consider a team defined as (P∞) (see (5)) with
the convex cost function in the second and third arguments
P-almost surely. Let the action spaces be convex for each
decision maker. Let the cost function be increasing in the last
argument, and vis be i.i.d. random variables. If there exists
a sequence of optimal policies for (PN ), {γ∗N}N (see (6)),
which converges pointwise to γ∗∞ then γ
∗
∞ as N →∞ (which
is identically symmetric) is an optimal policy for (P∞).
Proof. We show (14) holds, then we invoke Theorem 5. We
use the same definitions in Theorem 8 for measures QωN and
Qω. We have∫
Ω
lim inf
N→∞
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
QωN(du, dv)P(dω)
≥
∫
Ω
∫
Z
lim inf
N→∞
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du× V)
)
Qω(du, dv)P(dω)
(32)
≥
∫
Ω
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du × V)
)
Qω(du, dv)P(dω),
(33)
where (32) follows from a version of Fatou’s lemma
in [15, Theorem 1.1], and (33) is true since from
the lower semi-continuity of
∫
U
uQωN(du × V), we have
lim inf
N→∞
∫
U
uQωN(du × V) ≥
∫
U
uQω(du × V), and conti-
nuity and the hypothesis that the cost is increasing in the
last argument imply lim inf
N→∞
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
≥
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du × V)
)
P-almost surely and for all u ∈ U,
and this completes the proof.
In the following, observations need not be identical or
independent.
Theorem 11. Consider a team defined as (P∞) (see (5)) with
the convex cost function in the second and third arguments
P-almost surely. Let the action spaces be convex for each
decision maker. Let (a), and (c) in Theorem 6 hold, and
let observations be exchangeable conditioned on ω0. Assume
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there exists a sequence {γ∗N}N converges pointwise to γ
∗
∞
as N →∞, and let P-a.s.
||γ∗N (v
i)− γ∗∞(v
i)||2≤
f(vi)h(N)
N
, (34)
where lim
N→∞
N−1
∑N
i=1 f(v
i) < ∞ and lim
N→∞
h(N) = 0.
Then, a team optimal policy for (P∞) is symmetrically optimal
and an optimal policy is identified as a limit of a sequence of
team optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6)) as N →∞.
Proof. Following from the result of Theorem 7, one can
consider a sequence of N -DM teams which are symmetrically
optimal that defines (PN ) (see (6)) and whose limit is identi-
fied with (P∞). Equivalent to (b) in Theorem 6, we can show
that lim
N→∞
sup
1≤i≤N
||γ∗N (v
i)−γ∗∞(v
i)||2= 0 P-almost surely. We
have
lim
N→∞
sup
1≤i≤N
||γ∗N (v
i)− γ∗∞(v
i)||2
≤ lim
N→∞
N∑
i=1
||γ∗N (v
i)− γ∗∞(v
i)||2
≤ lim
N→∞
h(N)
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(vi) = 0,
where the last inequality follows from (34). Hence, thanks
to Theorem 6, a team optimal policy for (P∞) is the limit
of a sequence of team optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6))
as N → ∞, and hence a team optimal policy for (P∞) is
symmetrically optimal and the proof is completed.
C. An existence theorem on globally optimal policies for
mean-field team problems
An implication of our analysis is the following existence
result on globally optimal policies for mean-field problems. In
Theorem 8, we showed that if a pointwise limit of N → ∞
of a sequence of optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6)) exists,
this limit is a globally optimal policy for (P∞), but under
the conditions stated in the following theorem, an existence
result also can be established. In the following, we relax the
assumption that there exists a pointwise convergence sequence
of optimal policies for (PN ) (see (6)). For the following
theorem, we do not establish the pointwise convergence;
but clearly if a sequence of optimal policies for (PN ) (see
(6)) converges pointwise, a global optimal policy exists. Let
QωN (B) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 1ζiN∈B , where B ∈ Z := U × V, and
ζiN := (γ
∗
N (v
i), vi).
Theorem 12. Consider (P∞) (see (5)) with the convex cost
function in the second and third arguments P-almost surely.
Let the action spaces be convex for each decision maker.
Assume further that, for every i ∈ N, Ui = ∪lKl for
a countable collection of compact sets Kl (i.e., U
i is σ-
compact) and without any loss, the control laws can be
restricted to those with E(φi(u
i)) ≤ K for some finite K ,
where φi : U
i → R+ is lower semi-continuous and satisfies
lim
l→∞
inf
ui 6∈Kl
φi(u
i) =∞. If vis are i.i.d. random variables, then
there exists an optimal policy for (P∞).
We note that the limit policy is not necessarily determin-
istic according to the above result; this interesting discussion
is left open for further study.
Proof. We first show that {QωN}N is pre-compact in the
product space (V × U) equipped with the weak convergence
topology for each component. Then, we show that an induced
policy by the limit Qω achieves lower expected cost than
lim sup
N→∞
JN (γ
∗
N
), and we invoke Theorem 5 to complete the
proof. Action spaces and the cost function are convex and
following from the hypothesis that vis are i.i.d. random
variables (hence they are exchangeable conditioned on ω0)
and the result of Theorem 7, one can consider a sequence of
N -DM teams which are symmetrically optimal that defines
(PN ) (see (6)) and whose limit is identified with (P∞).
(Step 1): In the following, we show that for some converging
subsequence {Qωn}n∈I converges P-almost sure weakly to Q
ω,
that is, P-a.s., for every continuous and bounded function g,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQωn −
∫
gdQω
∣∣∣∣ = 0,
where n ∈ I is the index set of a convergent subsequence.
We use the fact that observations are i.i.d. and the space
of control policies is weakly compact (see e.g., [50, proof
of Theorem 4.7]). That is because, we can represent the
control policy spaces with the space of all joint measures
on (Vi × Ui) for each DM with a fixed marginal on vi
[52], [8]. Since the team is static, this decouples the policy
spaces from the policies of the previous decision makers,
and following from the hypothesis on φi and the fact that
ν →
∫
ν(dx)g(x) is lower semi-continuous for a continuous
function g [50, proof of Theorem 4.7], the marginals on Ui
will be weakly compact. If the marginals are weakly compact,
then the collection of all measures with these weakly compact
marginals are also weakly compact (see e.g., [49, Proof of
Theorem 2.4]) and hence the control policy space is weakly
compact. Using Tychonoff’s theorem, the countably infinite
product space is also compact under the product topology
which implies compactness of the space of control policies
under the product topology. Hence, there exists a subsequence
{Qωn}n∈I converges P-almost sure weakly to Q
ω.
(Step 2): Now, we show that (14) holds. We have∫
Ω
∫
Z
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du × V)
)
Qω(du, dv)P(dω)
= lim
M→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du× V)
)
}
×Qω(du, dv)P(dω) (35)
= lim
M→∞
∫
Ω
lim
n→∞
∫
Z
min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du× V)
)
}
×Qωn(du, dv)P(dω) (36)
= lim
M→∞
lim
n→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du× V)
)
}
×Qωn(du, dv)P(dω) (37)
≤ lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Ω
∫
Z
min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
}
×QωN(du, dv)P(dω) (38)
≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
c
(
ω0, γ
∗
N (v
i),
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ∗N (v
i)
)]
,
(39)
where (35) follows from the monotone convergence theo-
rem. Since {Qωn}n∈I converges P-almost sure weakly to
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Qω, we have by continuous mapping theorem (by consid-
ering a projection to the first component)
∫
U
uQωn(du ×
V) →
∫
U
uQω(du × V) P-almost surely. Following from
(Step 1), (36) follows from [45, Theorem 3.5]. That is
because, the cost function is continuous in actions, and
min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du × V)
)
} is continuously con-
verges in u, min{M, c(ω0, un,
∫
U
unQ
ω
n(du × V))} →
min{M, c(ω0, u,
∫
U
uQω(du × V))} where un → u as
n → ∞. Equality (37) follows from the dominated con-
vergence theorem since min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωn(du× V)
)
}
is bounded, and (38) is true since limsup is the greatest
convergent subsequence limit for a bounded sequence. Finally,
(39) follows from the definition of empirical measures and
since for every M , min{M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du× V)
)
} ≤
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQωN(du × V)
)
; hence, following from Theorem
5, Qω induces a globally optimal policy for (P∞).
We apply the results of this section in Section V-C.
V. EXAMPLES
In the following, we present a number of examples to
demonstrate results in previous sections. First, we consider
LQG and LQ static teams with coupling between states,
then we consider LQG symmetric static teams with coupling
between control actions. Moreover, we investigate dynamic
infinite-horizon average cost LQG teams with the classical
information structure.
A. Example 1, Static quadratic Gaussian teams with coupling
between states
Consider the following observation scheme,
vi = xi + zi, (40)
where {zi}i∈N and {xi}i∈N are i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian
random variables. Let {zi}i∈N be independent of {xi}i∈N. The
expected cost function is defined as
J(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
γ
[
N∑
i=1
R(ui)2 +Q(ui − xi − µN )
2
]
,
(41)
where µN :=
1
N
∑N
k=1 x
k and let R be a positive number and
Q be a non-negative number.
Theorem 13. For LQG static teams as formulated above, un-
der the measurement scheme (40), γi∗∞(v
i) is globally optimal
for (P∞) achieved as the limit N →∞ of γi∗N (v
i), an optimal
solution for (PN ).
Proof. We invoke Theorem 6 to prove the theorem. The
stationary policy (see Definition 3) is obtained as
γi∗N = (R +Q)
−1Q(1 +
1
N
)E(xi|vi),
where the equality follows from the assumption that xis are
independent of zis and xks, k 6= i for every i = 1, 2, ..., N and
they are mean zero. Following from [30], stationary policies
are team optimal for (PN ) in this formulation, and γi∗∞(v
i) =
(R + Q)−1QE(xi|vi). Since vis are zero mean Gaussian
random variables, we have E(xi|vi) = ΣxiviΣ
−1
vivi
vi := Kvi,
where ΣXY is defined as a covariance of two random variables
X and Y . We have P-almost surely,
sup
1≤i≤N
|γi∗N (v
i)− γi∗∞(v
i)| =
Q
R+Q
sup
1≤i≤N
|
1
N
E(xi|vi)|
=
KQ
R+Q
sup
1≤i≤N
|
1
N
vi|−−−−→
N→∞
0,
(42)
where (42) follows from
lim
N→∞
sup
1≤i≤N
1
N2
(vi)2 ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(vi)2 = 0 P− a.s,
where the first inequality is true since (vi)2s are non-negative,
and equality follows from the strong law of large numbers
(SLLN) since vis are i.i.d. and have a finite variance, hence, (b)
holds. One can show that the condition in Remark 2(ii) holds
since vis and xis are i.i.d. random variables, hence Theorem
6 completes the proof.
B. Example 2, Static non-Gaussian teams with coupling
between states
Let the observation scheme be (40), where {zi}i∈N and
{xi}i∈N are i.i.d. zero mean random variables with finite vari-
ance. Let {zi}i∈N be independent of {xi}i∈N. The expected
cost function is defined as (41). Let R be a positive number
and Q be a non-negative number.
Theorem 14. For LQ static teams as formulated above,
under the measurement scheme (40), γk∗∞ (v
k) = (R +
Q)−1QE(xk|vk) is globally optimal for (P∞) and is obtained
as the limit of γk∗N (v
k) as N →∞.
Proof. In the following, we use both Theorem 4 and Theorem
6. Clearly, (A1) holds, we show that (A2) holds,
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
(
N∑
i=1
(γi∗∞(v
i))2R+Q(γi∗∞(v
i)− xi − µN )
2
)
= lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E(
N∑
i=1
−Q2
Q+R
E
2(xi|vi)(1 +
2
N
)(xi + µN )
2Q)
(43)
≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
[
N∑
i=1
−Q2
Q+R
E
2(xi|vi)
]
+ lim
N→∞
Q(N + 3)σ2
N
(44)
=
−Q2
Q +R
E
(
E
2(x1|v1)
)
+Qσ2, (45)
where (43) follows from E
(
E(xi|vi)(xi + µN )
)
=
E
(
E
(
E(xi|vi)(xi + µN )|vi
))
= (1 + 1
N
)E
(
E
2(xi|vi)
)
,
and (44) is true since xi an zi are i.i.d. random variables
and lim sup
N→∞
aN + lim sup
N→∞
bN ≥ lim sup
N→∞
(aN + bN). We can
justify (45) by defining Y i := (E(xi|vi))2, and since Y is
are measurable functions of {vi}i≥1, and vis and xis are
i.i.d., hence Y is are i.i.d. random variables. Similarly, one
can show the other side direction for liminf. Hence (A2) is
satisfied. Now, we check (8), for every γk∞ with J(γ∞) <∞,
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
cuk(ω, γ
i∗, µ∗)(mk)
)
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= lim sup
N→∞
2Q
N
N∑
k=1
E
(
E(xk(mk)|v
k)
)
− E
(
(xk + µN )(mk)
)
(46)
= lim sup
N→∞
−2Q
N
N∑
k=1
E (µN (mk)) (47)
= 2Q lim sup
N→∞
1
N2
N∑
k=1
E
[
xkγk∗∞ (v
k)
]
− E
[
xkγk∞(v
k)
]
(48)
= −2Q lim inf
N→∞
1
N2
N∑
k=1
E
(
xkγk∞(v
k)
)
(49)
≥ −2Qσ lim inf
N→∞
1
N2
N∑
k=1
√
E [(γk∞(v
k))2] (50)
≥ −2Qσ lim inf
N→∞
sup
1≤k≤N
√
E [(γk∞(v
k))2]
N2
= 0, (51)
where measurability of mk := γ
k
∞(v
k)−γk∗∞ (v
k) with respect
to the σ-field generated by vk implies (46), and (47) follows
from the iterated expectations property. Since xps are mean
zero and independent of vk for k 6= p, we have (48), and (49)
follows from the fact that γk∗∞ is independent of k, and since
vk and xk are i.i.d. random variables. Moreover, J(γ
∞
) <∞,
so E(γk∞(v
k)) ≤ E
(
(γk∞(v
k))2
)
< ∞, and Cauchy–Schwarz
inequality implies (50), and (51) follows from
lim inf
N→∞
sup
1≤k≤N
E
[
(γk∞(v
k))2
]
N2
≤ lim inf
N→∞
1
N2
N∑
k=1
E
[
(γk∞(v
k))2
]
= 0, (52)
where (52) is true since E
[
(γk∞(v
k))2
]
≥ 0 and
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
(∑N
k=1
(
γk∞(v
k)
)2
R
)
≤ J(γ
∞
) <∞. Thus, (8)
is satisfied and Theorem 4 completes the proof.
One can also invoke Theorem 6 to complete the proof. One
can show that the condition in Remark 2(ii) holds since vis and
xis are i.i.d. random variables. We only justify (b). Stationary
policy is team optimal for (PN ) in this formulation [30], hence
γi∗N (v
i) = (R+Q)−1Q(1 + 1
N
)E(xi|vi), so we need to show
that
lim
N→∞
sup
1≤i≤N
∣∣γi∗N (vi)− γi∗∞(vi)∣∣ = 0 P− a.s,
Equivalently, we can show that P-a.s
lim
N→∞
sup
1≤i≤N
1
N2
(
E(xi|vi)
)2
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(
E(xi|vi)
)2
= 0,
where the first inequality is true since
(
E(xi|vi)
)2
s are non-
negative, and equality follows from SLLN since
E
(
(E(xi|vi))2
)
= E
(
(xi)2
)
− E
(
(xi − E(xi|vi))2
)
<∞,
and (E
(
xi|vi)
)2
are i.i.d. sequence of random variables since
vis are i.i.d. random variables and the proof is completed.
C. Example 3, LQG symmetric teams with coupling between
control actions
Let
vi = Hix+ zi, (53)
where {zi}i∈N is independent sequence of zero mean Gaussian
random vectors also independent of x, with covariance Σjj =
N0 > 0. Define ω = (x, z), where x is a Gaussian random
vector with covariance E(xxT ) = Σ00. Let
J(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
γ [
N∑
i=1
(ui)TRui − 2
N∑
i=1
(ui)TD
× (x+
1
N
N∑
k=1
uk) + (x +
1
N
N∑
k=1
uk)TQ(x+
1
N
N∑
k=1
uk)],
(54)
where R is an appropriate dimension positive definite matrix
and D, and Q are appropriate dimension positive semi-definite
matrices, and R > 2D. In the following, we follow steps in
[51, Theorem 2.6.8] to obtain optimal policies for (PN ).
Lemma 3. Consider N -DM LQG team formulated above,
under the measurement scheme (53), the global optimal policy
for (PN ) is linear, i.e., γ
k∗
N (v
k) = πkNv
k. Here, πkN ∈
Mn,m(R), n ×m real-valued matrix, is obtained by solving
the following parallel update scheme,
πkN,(i) = −LN [S
k +
1
N
N∑
p=1,p6=k
π
p
N,(i)H
pSk], (55)
where LN := (R +
Q
N2
− 2D
N
)−1(Q
N
− D), Sk :=
Σ00(H
k)T (HkΣ00(H
k)T +Σkk)
−1 and the initial points of
the iterations are considered as zero functions.
Proof. By Definition 3, stationary policies satisfy the follow-
ing equality for k = 1, . . . , N ,
Mγk∗N (v
k) +
(
Q
N
−D
)
×

E(x|vk) + 1
N
N∑
p=1,p6=k
E
(
γ
p∗
N (v
p)|vk
) = 0, (56)
where M := R + Q
N2
− 2D
N
, and (56) can be rewritten as
PRˆγ∗
N
(v) + Pr(ω) = 0, where P is a block diagonal matrix
with ii-th block Piiβ
i(ω) := E(βi(ω)|vi), Rˆ is a matrix where
Rˆii := M and Rˆij :=
1
N
(
Q
N
−D) for every i, j = 1, ..., N ,
j 6= i, and r(ω) = x. Note that P is a projection operator
defined on a Hilbert space whose operator norm is one. Now,
we use the successive approximation method [51, Theorem
A.6.4]. According to (56), we can write for k = 1, 2, ..., N
Mγk∗N,(i)(v
k) + ǫγk∗N,(i)(v
k)− ǫγk∗N,(i)(v
k) +
(
Q
N
−D
)
×

E(x|vk) + 1
N
N∑
p=1,p6=k
E
(
γ
p∗
N,(i)(v
p)|vk
) = 0.
Thus, by dividing the expression over ǫ and rearranging it, we
have
γk∗N,(i)(v
k) = (1−
Rˆii
ǫ
)γk∗N,(i)(v
k)−
1
ǫ
(
Q
N
−D
)
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×

E(x|vk) + 1
N
N∑
p=1,p6=k
E
(
γ
p∗
N,(i)(v
p)|vk
) ,
where the initial points of the iterations are zero functions.
We can write γ∗
N
(v) = P (I − 1
ǫ
Rˆ)γ∗
N
(v)− 1
ǫ
Pr(ω). Similar
to [51, Theorem 2.6.5], the above sequence converges to
the unique fixed point if and only if the spectral radius
satisfies the following constraint ρ
(
P (I − Rˆ
ǫ
)
)
= ρ(I −
Rˆ
ǫ
) := lim
k→∞
sup[||A||k]
1
k < 1, where A := I −
Rˆ
ǫ
, ||A||:=
sup
||x||<1
||Ax|| and ρ denotes spectral radius. The first equality
is true since both P and A maps ΓN into itself and P has
operator norm equal to one. The above constraint can be
always satisfied by choosing ǫ = 12 (λmax(Rˆ) + λmin(Rˆ)).
On the other hand, since (x, z1, . . . , zN ) are jointly Gaussian,
then γk∗N (v
k) = πkNv
k for k = 1, . . . , N . Hence, γk∗
N,(i)(v
k) =
πkN,(i)v
k, and by linearity of the conditional expectation, we
have E(x|vk) = Skvk, and E(γp∗N (v
p)|vk) = πpNH
pSkvk.
Hence (55) holds. Following from [51], the stationary policy
is globally team optimal for (PN ), and this completes the
proof.
Theorem 15. Consider (P∞) with the expected cost (54).
Under the following measurement scheme
vi = Hx+ zi, (57)
where zis are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors, γi∗∞(v
i) = π∗∞v
i
is an optimal control law for (P∞) and is the pointwise limit
of γi∗N (v
i) = π∗Nv
i, an optimal control law for (PN ).
Proof. In the following, we invoke Proposition 1 and The-
orem 9 to prove the theorem. Under (57), the static team
is symmetrically optimal and hence from (55), we have
π∗N = LN [S + N
−1(N − 1)π∗NHS], π
∗
∞ = R
−1D[S +
π∗∞HS], where LN := (N
2R− 2DN +Q)−1(N2D −NQ),
S := Σ00(H)
T (HΣ00(H)
T +Σkk)
−1. Since for every N ,
we have JN (γ
∗
N
) < ∞, and since R > 0, we have
sup
N≥1
E(||γ∗N (v
1)||22+||γ
∗
∞(v
1)||22) < ∞, which implies (A3).
The proof is completed using the results of Proposition 1 and
Theorem 9. One can also invoke Theorem 11 to justify the
result.
1) Example 4, Asymmetric LQG team problems: Here, we
consider simple variation of Example 3 considered above to
illustrate Remark 4. Consider the observation scheme (57), and
let the expected cost function be defined as
J(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
γ [
N∑
i=1
(ui)TRui − 2
N∑
i=1
(ui)TD
× (x+
1
N
N∑
k=1
uk) + (x+
1
N
N∑
k=1
uk)TQ(x+
1
N
N∑
k=1
uk)
+
1
N
M∑
k=1
(uk)Tαku
k],
whereM ∈ Z+ is independent of N . Clearly, the N -DM team
admits asymmetric optimal policies for PN with the expected
cost JN for every N . However, one can observe that the
last term above goes to zero as N → ∞ under a sequence
of optimal policies, and hence asymptotically the expected
cost would essentially be (54) and Theorem 13 implies γ∗∞
is an optimal policy since P-almost surely the sequence QwN
converges weakly to Qw (the asymmetric term vanishes when
N → ∞). That is, the optimal policy designed for the
symmetric problem is also a solution for the asymmetric
problem, since under this policy the additional term (which is
a non-negative contribution) vanishes, certifying its optimality.
D. Example 5, Multivariable classical Linear Quadratic
Gaussian problems: Average cost optimality through static
reduction
Here, we revisit a well-known problem and a well-known
solution, using the technique presented in this paper. Let
Xt+1 = AXt +Bu
t + wt,
where A ∈ Mn,n(R), B ∈ Mn,m(R) and wts and X0 are
i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors with mean zero and positive
variance taking values in Rn. Let (A,B) be controllable and
let
J(γ) = lim sup
T→∞
JT (γ)
:= lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
γ
(
T−1∑
t=0
XTt QXt + (u
t)TRut
)
,
where Q ≥ 0 and R > 0 are appropriate dimensions real
matrices. We can write,
J(γ) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
γ [
T−1∑
t=0
(
t∑
k=1
At−kBuk−1 +
t∑
k=0
At−kζk
)T
×Q
(
t∑
k=1
At−kBuk−1 +
t∑
k=0
At−kζk
)
+ (ut)TRut],
where ζ = (XT0 , (w
0)T , (w1)T , . . . )T . In the following, we
consider fully observed classical IS, i.e., Y t = Xt, and we
can write Y t = Htζ +
∑t−1
j=0Dtju
j , where Ht and Dtj are
appropriate dimensional matrices. Using [23, Theorem 1], we
can reduce IS to the static one as V t = H˜tζ. According to [22,
Section 3.5], we have ut∗T = G
t
TXt for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
where kTT = 0, and
GtT = −(R+B
Tkt+1T B)
−1BTkt+1T A, (58)
ktT = Q+A
Tkt+1T A−A
Tkt+1T B(R+B
Tkt+1T B)
−1BT kt+1T A.
(59)
Theorem 16. For LQG teams with the classical information
structure as formulated above, ut∗ = lim
T→∞
γt∗T (v
t) = γt∗∞(v
t)
is the optimal policy for J(γ), where {γt∗T }T is a sequence of
optimal policies for {JT (γT )}T with the pointwise limit γ
t∗
∞
as T →∞.
Although, this result is a classical one in the literature,
here, we present a new approach using the static reduction.
Proof. Since, ktT+1 = k
t−1
T for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , one can write
(59) as
ktT = Q+A
T ktT−1A−A
T ktT−1B(R +B
TktT−1B)
−1BT ktT−1A.
We use Theorem 5 and Remark 1, to show that ut∗∞ = G∞Xt
is team optimal, where G∞ = −(R + BTC∗B)−1BTC∗A,
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and following from controllability of (A,B), C∗ =
lim
β→1
Cβ , a fixed point of the following recursion ex-
ists, Cβ(n) = Q + A
TβCβ(n − 1)A − ATβCβ(n −
1)B
(
R+BTβCβ(n− 1)B
)−1
BTβCβ(n−1)A. By compar-
ing C∗(n) = lim
β→1
C∗β(n) and (59), we see that lim
T→∞
ktT =
K = C∗ = lim
n→∞
C∗(n). Hence, we have for t =
0, 1, . . . , T − 1, lim
T→∞
GtT = −(R + B
TKB)−1BTKA =
−(R+BTC∗B)−1BTC∗A = G∞. In the following, we show
(14) holds using Remark 1.
lim sup
T→∞
|JT (γ
∗
T
)− JT (γ
∗
∞
)|
≤ lim sup
T→∞
sup
0≤t≤T−1
|E[
t∑
k=0
Tr
[
ζTk
(
L
t,k
T
)T
(HtT )L
t,k
T ζk
]
]
− E[
t∑
k=0
Tr
[
ζTk
(
Lt,k∞
)T
(Ht∞)L
t,k
∞ ζk
]
]| (60)
≤ lim sup
T→∞
sup
0≤t≤T−1
|E[
t∑
k=0
Tr[ζkζ
T
k (
(
L
t,k
T
)T
(HtT )L
t,k
T
−
(
Lt,k∞
)T
(Ht∞)L
t,k
∞ )]]| (61)
≤ Σ2 lim sup
T→∞
sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr
[
(HtT )C
t
T − (H
t
∞)C
t
∞
]
| (62)
≤ Σ2 lim sup
T→∞
[ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr((GtT )
TRGtTC
t
T
− (G∞)
TRG∞C
t
∞)|+ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(QetT )|] (63)
≤ Σ2 lim sup
T→∞
[ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr
(
(GtT )
TRGtT − (G∞)
TRG∞
)
|
× sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(CtT )|
+ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(GT∞RG∞e
t
T )|+ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(QetT )|]
(64)
≤ Σ2 lim sup
T→∞
[ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr
[
(GtT (G
t
T )
T −G∞G
T
∞)R
]
|
× ( sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(etT )|+ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(Ct∞)|)
+ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(GT∞RG∞e
t
T )|+ sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(QetT )|] = 0,
(65)
where L
t,k
T :=
∏t−1
p=k(A+BG
p
T ), L
t,k
∞ :=
∏t−1
p=k(A+BG∞),
HtT = (Q + (G
t
T )
TRGtT ), H
t
∞ = (Q + (G∞)
TRG∞),
etT := C
t
T − C
t
∞, and C
t
T :=
[∑t
k=0 L
t,k
T
(
L
t,k
T
)T ]
, Ct∞ :=[∑t
k=0 L
t,k
∞
(
Lt,k∞
)T ]
and Σ2 := max(σ2X0 , σ
2
w), where σ
2
X0
and σ2w are the variance of each component of X0 and wk,
respectively. Equality (60) follows from the fact that the
trace of scalar is the scalar itself and the fact that {wk}k
are i.i.d. and independent from X0. Inequality (61) follows
from the trace property that Tr(ABC) = Tr(CAB), and
(62) follows from the hypothesis that ζks are i.i.d. random
vectors and Tr(ABC) = Tr(BCA) and (63) follows from
linearity of the trace and sup f+g ≤ sup f+sup g. Inequality
(64) follows from adding and subtracting GT∞RG∞C
t
T in the
first term and using Tr(AB) ≤ Tr(A)Tr(B) for A and B
positive semi-definite matrices since one can observe that (59)
implies for a fixed T , {ktT }
T−1
t=0 is a decreasing sequence, i.e.,
K > k0T > k
1
T > · · · > k
T−1
T , and hence {G
t
T (G
t
T )
T }T−1t=0
is a decreasing sequence. Also, from (58) we have for a
fixed T , {(A + BGtT )(A + BG
t
T )
T }T−1t=0 is an increasing
sequence, hence one can show (GtT )
TRGtT − G
T
∞RG∞ is
positive semi-definite, and (65) follows from the definition of
etT and the following calculation. First, we show that for a
fixed T , {Tr(etT )}
T−1
t=0 is an increasing sequence using the
aforementioned observations. Hence,
lim
T→∞
sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(etT )|= lim
T→∞
|Tr(eT−1T )|= 0.
Similarly, lim
T→∞
sup0≤t≤T−1|Tr(Qe
t
T )|= 0. We have,
lim
T→∞
sup
0≤t≤T−1
|Tr(Ct∞)|=
∣∣Tr [(I − (A+BG∞))−1]∣∣ = 0,
where Y (T ) denotes the T power of the matrix Y and the result
follows from the fact that ||A + BG∞||< 1 (following from
the controllability assumption, the optimal policy stabilizes the
dynamics). Finally, we have
lim
T→∞
sup
0≤t≤T−1
∣∣Tr [(GtT (GtT )T −G∞GT∞)R]∣∣ = 0
where the second equality follows from the aforementioned
observations and since R is positive definite. Therefore,
lim sup
T→∞
JT (γ
∗
T
)−J(γ∗
∞
) = 0, and the proof is completed.
Remark 6. Similarly, one can show the result for (i) Y t =
CXt, (A,C) is observable and Q = CTC, (ii) the discounted
LQG team problems with the classical information structure.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied static teams with countably
infinite number of DMs. We presented sufficient conditions
for team optimality concerning average cost problems. Also,
constructive results have been established to obtain the team
optimal solution for static teams with countably infinite num-
ber of DMs as limits of the optimal solutions for static teams
with finite number of DMs as the number of DMs goes
to infinity. We also studied sufficient conditions for team
optimality of symmetric static teams and mean-field teams
under relaxed conditions.
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